Journal article

Ideology as misrecognition

Published in Global Discourse

Abstract

Theories of recognition often acknowledge that some forms of recognition can be ideological. Only recently have authors also begun to ask whether all ideological phenomena involve a more basic form of misrecognition of epistemic agents. I argue that an expressivist reconstruction of the Marxian theory of ideology can help us to understand what forms of misrecognition are involved in ideology. According to this understanding, ideological discourses reflect the rules of hierarchical social practices and impose limits on the capacity of subjects to challenge dominant conceptual distinctions. While rational epistemic subjects will tend to experience such limits as misrecognition, this does not require any negative interpersonal attitudes on the part of others. Therefore, at least some forms of ideology involve primarily structural, rather than interpersonal, misrecognition. I argue that ideologies that persist without involving widespread false beliefs can best be understood in this way and that neoliberalism is a paradigmatic example of such an ideology.

Publication details

Date of publication
29 Nov 2023
Volume
14
Issue
1
Pages
20-39

Bibliometrics

OpenAlex

View record
Citation count
6
Collected 2026-08-22
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
2.85
Collected 2026-08-22
Citation percentile
91.7%
Percentile among comparable publications of the same age and field.

About FWCI: Field-Weighted Citation Impact compares citations received with the number expected for a work of the same type, year, and subfield. A value of 1.0 represents the world average.

Google Scholar

View record
Citation count
7
Collected 2026-08-16